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A B S T R A C T   
This article studies how three groups of professional decision-makers – child welfare workers, experts on children 
and judges – exercise discretion in decisions on adoption from care in the Norwegian child welfare system. The 
analysis is based on near 500 decision-makers’ responses to a vignette about David, a four-year-old boy whose 
foster parents want to adopt him. After reading the vignette, decision-makers were asked to choose a measure for 
David: adoption or continued foster care. They were thereupon asked (1) which specific features of the case were 
decisive to their decision and (2) in which ways the case would have to be different for them to make a different 
decision. The objective of the study is to examine how the decision-makers who chose adoption for David reason 
their decision and to locate the pivotal dimensions in their best interest assessment. Results show that although 
variance is located between and within decision-maker groups, the similarities in discretionary reasoning are 
prevailing. The justifications for adoption were varied and generally child-centered, while the factors that had 
power to transform a decision were mainly parent-oriented and focused entirely on the parents’ commitment and 
capabilities as well as the relationship the child has or could have with his parents. The decision-makers’ exercise 
of discretion mirrors the tensions between children’s rights and family preservation in modern child welfare 
practice and the need for measures to guide decision-making behavior and improve the quality of discretionary 
reasoning is discussed.   
1. Introduction 
Professional child welfare decision-makers occupy the role as in-
terpreters of democratically constituted law and policy through their 
power to exercise discretion. With limited political guidance and 
ambiguous legal criteria, child welfare workers, experts on children and 
judges are delegated with the authority to make decisions on the 
strongest measure in the Norwegian Child Welfare Act (1992) (CWA): 
adoption from care without parental consent (section 4–20). Though all 
European countries have legal mechanisms that allow for adoption 
without consent (Fenton-Glynn, 2015), we know very little about the 
actual decisions. To address this research gap, I examine how nearly 500 
professional decision-makers from the County Social Welfare Board (the 
County Board) and the municipal child welfare services justify their 
decision for adoption from care when presented with a vignette about a 
four-year-old boy whose foster parents want to adopt him. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated that adoptions can only be 
consented to in ‘exceptional circumstances’ and with an inquiry into the 
rationales behind adoption recommendations and decisions we are able 
to shed some light on what circumstances constitutes exceptionality in 
the eyes of the surveyed decision-makers. 
With the objective to understand and explain discretionary decision- 
making on adoption, three questions are examined: Which factors are 
important when child welfare decision-makers decide on adoption? 
How are different considerations balanced against each other? Are there 
similarities or differences within and between decision-maker groups 
and decision-making levels? The justifications they provide for their 
decision to choose adoption is examined to find out how they reason 
their decision and to locate the pivotal dimensions in the process. 
Analyzing responses to a vignette not only enables us to elucidate when 
decision-makers perceive adoption to be in the best interest of the child 
and why, it also allows for comparison of what decision-makers 
emphasize when reading and assessing the same set of conditions and 
to identify variation and congruence in reasoning for adoption. 
In the following section the background and context for decision- 
making on adoption from care is laid out, followed by an outline of 
previous research and the conditions for discretion in adoption decision- 
making in the Norwegian context. Next, a presentation of the conceptual 
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and theoretical framework for the study is provided before the data 
material and methodological approach for the study is described 
together with a discussion of its limitations. Then the findings are pre-
sented, followed by a discussion and finally, some concluding 
comments. 
2. Background and context for decision-making 
In 2019, the ECtHR Grand Chamber concluded (by 13 votes to four) 
that the Norwegian state had violated the right to respect for family life 
on under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
(1950) on procedural grounds in a case where a young boy had been 
adopted by his foster parents (Strand-Lobben and Others v. Norway 
[GC] 2019, see Breen et al., 2020).12 The decision quickly became a 
“showcase for the controversies and the tensions in the field of child 
protection” (Skivenes, 2019, n.p.) and effectively prompted us of the 
difficulty of the task decision-makers are faced with when balancing the 
rights and interests of children and parents in cases on adoption. This 
balancing act is together with the interpretation of harms and benefits 
(Munro, 2019) fundamental to child welfare decision-making (Munro, 
2011; Ward, Brown, and Westlake, 2012) and it requires professional 
discretion. This exercise of discretionary reasoning is crucial to examine. 
While discretion is both necessary and inevitable (Handler, 1986; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000), professionals’ exercise of 
discretion is famously termed ‘the black hole of democracy’ due to the 
lack of democratic control and influence over decision-making (Roth-
stein, 1998, 80). Discretion thus complicates measures of accountability 
and furthermore threatens the rule of law and its principles of predict-
ability, legality and equal treatment (Molander, Grimen, and Eriksen, 
2012; Schneider, 1990). In the Norwegian context, the discretionary 
scope provided for decision-makers to make decisions on adoption and 
to assess the child’s interests is wide (Tefre, 2020a; Berrick et al., 2015; 
Skivenes and Sørsdal, 2018). This leaves room for emotions, assump-
tions and presumptions to guide decisions on the best interest of the 
child and for professionals themselves to fill in the ‘loopholes’ left out 
from the democratically enacted laws and policy (Artis, 2004; Dworkin, 
1967; Elster, 1989; Goodin, 1986; Piper, 2000). 
Adoption from care is a strong measure with far-reaching implica-
tions and it can be considered controversial (see e.g. Sloan, 2015a; 
2015b; Ward and Smeeton, 2017). The measure is also rarely used in 
Norway with less than one percent of the children in foster care being 
adopted in 2018 (Helland, Pedersen, & Skivenes, 2020)3. At the same 
time, studies into adoption of long-term placed foster children show that 
adoption produces better outcomes in youth and in adult life compared 
to continued foster home placements, residential care or reunification 
with biological families (Brown et al., 2017; Christoffersen et al., 2007; 
Hjern et al., 2019; Selwyn and Quinton, 2004; Triseliotis, 2002; Vin-
nerljung and Hjern, 2011; see also Palacios et al., 2019). Though the 
prospects are generally better for younger placed children, research 
shows that children that have been in the child welfare system fare 
worse than their peers in the general population on a range of living 
conditions both in youth and as adults (Backe-Hansen et al., 2014; 
Kääriäläa and Hiilamoa, 2017). We do not know how many of the 
children in the Norwegian foster care system remain in long-term 
placements until adulthood, but there is reason to believe that the 
number is substantial (see discussion in Gerdts-Andresen, 2020; Helland 
and Skivenes, 2019). Current adoption policy is somewhat indetermi-
nate, albeit since the early 2000s, there was a shift towards a more active 
policy to promote adoptions. This has been interpreted as a move to-
wards a more child centric policy (Tefre, 2020b) and it is expected that 
this will be reflected in the decision-makers’ choices and justifications. 
3. Research on justifications for adoption 
There is a scarcity of research focusing on decision-making practice 
and the discretion of child welfare professionals, both internationally 
and in Norway. A study of particular interest for the study at hand is a 
study from 2012 by Skivenes and Tefre (2012). They use a vignette 
method to study how Norwegian, as well as American and English, child 
welfare decision-makers justify their decisions for or against adoption. 
The authors found that fewer Norwegian child welfare workers sug-
gested adoption (62 percent) than English (98 percent) and American 
(Californian) (96 percent) child welfare workers and emphasize that the 
Norwegian decision-makers used their discretion in an evidence- 
oriented manner and went beyond policy guidelines and instructions. 
In another study from Norway where 21 adoption agency files (from 
years 1985 to 2009) are reviewed in order to find out why these cases 
had ended with adoption, Young (2012) found that there was a lack of 
attention to the children and that they were generally overshadowed by 
the social workers’ descriptions of the mothers’ actions and qualities, 
particularly concerning failures to act a stable parent in relation to 
visitation. In an analysis of all decisions on adoption (n = 594) made by 
the County Board in 2016, Helland and Skivenes (2019) found that the 
decision-makers paid particular attention to the relation between the 
child and her parents. Another prominent feature of the decisions was 
the pursuit to determine whether there were distinctive features related 
to the individual child that would elucidate whether an adoption should 
be consented to or not, such as the child’s situation of vulnerability. In a 
recent study of the legitimacy of all judgments on adoption from the 
Norwegian Supreme Court (four judgments from 2015 to 2019) the 
court’s argumentation was analyzed (Helland, submitted for publica-
tion). The author argues that while some arguments were considered 
consistently across the four judgments (arguments related to the child’s 
right to family life – biological and de facto family – to time and timing, 
and to the child’s autonomy and development) there was variation in 
court’s discretion, inter alia in how considerations were justified and 
how they were weighted and balanced against each other. 
Internationally, two relevant studies are identified. Ben-David 
(2016) has studied how the court decided in 261 cases on termination of 
parental rights (TPR) and adoption in Israel where as in Norway, the 
main assessment criteria underlying both TPR and adoption in-
terventions is the best interest of the child. The author found that the 
courts referred more to treatment-oriented considerations, such as 
normative parental functioning, parental readiness to change, parental 
educational capacity, the influence of adoption on a child’s emotional 
well-being, and parental social normativity, than to legal values in their 
assessments of whether TPR is in the best interest of the child (Ben- 
David, 2016). In a smaller study from 2017 (Butlinski et al., 2017) on 
how decision makers understand the adoption of children from out-of- 
home care, interviews with 21 professionals (child welfare specialists, 
adoption and permanent care specialists and judicial officers) from a 
region in Australia5 were conducted and the authors identified five 
common themes as important for the consideration of adoption: parental 
consent, stability for children, a sense of belonging for children, chil-
dren’s connection to their birth family and children’s connection to their 
cultural heritage. 
Some common denominators can be drawn from these studies and 
the expectation is that we will find justifications that relate particularly 
to parental functioning, capabilities and qualities and, furthermore, to 1 On March 10th, 2020 the ECtHR judged violation in the case of Pedersen 
and Others v. Norway.  
2 At the present, 10 cases on adoption are communicated to the Norwegian 
state and are pending a decision by the ECtHR.  
3 See Pösö, Skivenes, and Thoburn (2021) for an overview on adoptions from 
care in Norway, as well as seven other European countries and the US. 
4 The analysis included one decision from 2017.  
5 143 children were reported adopted by their carers in Australia in the years 
2016 and 2017 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2017). 
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features that relate to the child’s right to a biological family life in terms 
of bonds to parents and visitation (contact), and to the child’s well-being 
in terms of concern with attachment, stability and permanence. 
4. Conditions for discretion 
4.1. Legal regulation and case law 
An adoption implies that the parental responsibility is transferred 
from the biological parents to the adoptive parents, thus terminating 
parental rights for the former. A decision on adoption is as such seen as 
intervening with the child’s and the parents’ right to private and family 
life (Sandberg, 2016) as protected through The Norwegian Constitution 
(Article 102), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
(1989) (Article 16), and Article 8 of the ECHR. While the ECtHR has set 
the threshold for the intervention high, they do approve of adoption 
without parental consent (Skivenes and Søvig, 2016) albeit decisions 
must be justified according to “an overriding requirement pertaining to 
the child’s best interests” (Aune v. Norway, 2010, para. 66). In Nor-
wegian case law, “particularly weighty reasons“ is interpreted as rep-
resenting the same norm (Sandberg 2020, 151). 
Termination of parental responsibility and adoption without 
parental consent is regulated through the Norwegian Child Welfare Act 
(CWA) (1992), section 4–20 which sets four cumulative legal conditions 
for adoption6: a) The placement is expected to be permanent based on 
the consideration of two of the alternative criteria: The parents are 
permanently unable to provide proper care or the child has become so 
attached to their new environment that removal will lead to serious 
problems; b) Adoption is in the child’s best interest; c) The adoption 
applicants are the child’s foster parents and they have proven fit to care 
for the child; d) The conditions in the Adoption Act (2017) are fulfilled. 
According to the Adoption Act, the overriding consideration for un-
dertaking an adoption should be the child́s best interest and in addition 
to serving as a concrete condition for adoption, the child’s best interest 
is through section 4–1 a general guiding principle for the application 
of all provisions implemented by the CWA. This implies that the assess-
ments undertaken should reflect the child’s best interest, irrespective of 
what section 4–20 condition is assessed, and the justifications that are 
studied in the paper will be interpreted accordingly. Contact visits be-
tween the child and his or her parents after adoption (open adoption) 
can be established by the County Board if either of the parties have 
requested it and if the prospective adopters (foster parents) consent to 
such contact (CWA section 4-20a). 
4.2. System characteristics 
The Norwegian child welfare system is characterized as family- 
service-oriented and child-centered (Skivenes, 2011). Family-service 
refers to a low threshold for intervention in order to mitigate serious 
risk and prevention of harm based on ‘a therapeutic view of rehabili-
tation in which it is possible for people to revise and improve their 
lifestyles and behaviors (Skivenes and Søvig, 2017), whereas child- 
centrism signifies an elevated focus on children’s rights and best in-
terests and the endorsement of children as independent bearers of in-
dividual social and human rights (Skivenes, 2011; James and Prout, 
1997). There are four governing principles of child welfare practice in 
Norway which in many ways epitomize the intersection of interests and 
rights that are at stake in decisions on adoption (Skivenes, 2011; Lindbo, 
2011). First, the principle of least intrusive form of intervention entails 
that any decision to intervene should seek to limit the level of intrusion 
into the family. Second, the stability principle refers to the promotion of 
stability in the child’s relationships to adults and other important per-
sons and to stable surroundings. Third, the biological principle, which 
builds on the normative idea that it is in the best interest of children to 
be brought up with their parents (Skivenes, 2002). And fourth, the best 
interest of the child. 
Proceeding an adoption case to a conclusion is a two-level process. At 
the first level, the responsibility to initiate a case for adoption lies with 
the municipalities and the local child welfare authorities (child welfare 
workers), while the County Board (experts and judges) holds the au-
thority to enforce an actual decision to consent to adoption or not, at the 
second level. The County Board is a court-like judicial decision-making 
body which serves as an impartial and independent judiciary body that 
makes decisions in cases concerning compulsory measures pursuant to 
the Norwegian Child Welfare Act. The County Board is headed by a 
lawyer qualified as a judge7 and is further composed by a layman as well 
as an expert member (in most cases a psychologist)8 (The County Social 
Welfare Board, n.d.) whose role it is to complement the qualities of the 
judge and the layman. The influence and authority of the members 
should be equal, and decisions are voted over (Skivenes and Tonheim, 
2017). While judges are permanently employed at the County Boards, 
the laymen and experts are temporary members of two respective panels 
where they are appointed to the County Board on an individual basis. 
When referring to County Board decision-makers in the present study, 
these are judges and experts (see methods and data section). 
5. Discretion and the best interest principle 
Decision-makers in the County Board and in the child welfare ser-
vices are authorized with the autonomy to exercise discretion in their 
application of rules in decision-making. Because of this, it has been 
argued that these decision-makers, the street-level bureaucrats, are the 
real policy-makers (Biland and Steinmetz, 2017; Lipsky, 1980; Portillo 
and Rudes, 2014). Discretion is commonly conceptualized as the choices 
made in the space between rules (Hawkins, 1992). Discretion is a thus 
relative concept in the sense that it has meaning only in relation to its 
context, the rules and standards surrounding a decision (Dworkin, 
1967). One should furthermore make the distinction between the space 
for discretion, the autonomy to judge, and the exercised discretion as a 
form of reasoning (Molander, Grimen, and Eriksen, 2012). Discretionary 
reasoning forms the basis for judgements, decisions or choices of actions 
or inactions that need to be justified (Molander et al., 2012; Feldman, 
1992, 164) in order to be perceived legitimate (Feteris and Kloosterhuis, 
2009; Alexy, 1989; Habermas, 1996). When decisions-makers are 
delegated with discretionary powers from the state, he or she is so under 
the condition that they can be held accountable (Molander, Grimen, and 
Eriksen, 2012) and Molander (2016, 21) asserts that “judgments and 
decisions involve reasoning, and we expect agents with discretionary 
power to act on the basis of their best judgment, which means that their 
actions are supported by good reasons”. Our expectations should thus be 
that the reasons the entrusted professional decision-makers give reflect 
what they are convinced are good reasons. 
5.1. Professional discretion and the best interest of the child 
By adopting a socio-legal approach to discretion9, discretion is to be 
6 No conditions are given for termination of parental responsibility, but as for 
all measures applied by chapter four in the CWA (Section 4–1, 1992), decisive 
importance shall be attached to the child’s best interests. 
7 For this reason and for the sake of simplicity, I will from hereon use the term 
‘judge’ instead of ‘County Board leader’ which is the official Norwegian term 
for this position.  
8 The County Boards could be composed of five members, should the case in 
question require it. In these cases, the County Board leader is accompanied by 
two experts and two lay members.  
9 According to Mascini (2020), a socio-legal approach furthermore waives the 
basic assumption that there is a fundamental difference in how judges and 
others, such as street-level bureaucrats. 
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understood within a given political, social and professional context and 
as the manner in which decision-makers apply such standards and 
general rules to concrete cases (Hawkins, 2003; Mascini, 2020) and 
make sense of them in practice: 
“Facts do not speak for themselves; they are ordered and arranged by 
actors for a purpose. Social and ethical commitments, as well as legal 
principles, also affect ‘legal’ decision-making” (Evans and Hupe 
2020, p. 114). 
The legal frames and political guidance for discretionary decision- 
making include national legislation and case law, policies, and regula-
tions, as well as international conventions and treaties. In decisions on 
adoption, the best interest of the child is the immediate, concrete legal 
standard decision-makers face and it is also the most contested and dis-
agreed upon condition in decisions on adoption from care (Helland and 
Skivenes, 2019; NOU, 2012: 5). It is stated in article 3 of the (CRC 1989) that: 
“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative au-
thorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration.” 
The CRC (1989) applies as law in Norway after the incorporation into 
the Human Rights Act in 2003 (Section 2, with precedence over other 
laws pursuant to Section 3) (Gording-Stang, 2018; Skivenes and Sørsdal, 
2018) and children have a constitutional right to have their best interest 
considered in matters that concern them (The Norwegian Constitution, 
Article 104(2)). According to Norwegian child welfare legislation (CWA, 
1992 chapter four) the best interest shall have ‘decisive importance’ in 
all measures taken for them (Archard and Skivenes, 2010). Determining 
what is in the best interest of a child is a decision that should be based on 
scientific and professional knowledge of children’s development and 
needs. In addition, decision-makers are also required to make sense of 
what is right, good and appropriate for a child in a given situation 
through a process of reasoning (Skivenes and Pösö, 2017). Following 
legal scholar Michael Freeman, such best interest decisions “should be 
supported by reasoned arguments, and bias or worse prejudice should be 
eliminated” (Freeman, 2007, p. 28). In child welfare matters however, 
making rational decisions is difficult due to the pressing elements of 
uncertainty, the balancing of different parties’ needs and interests and 
last but not least, owing to the ambiguous and normative character of 
the best interest standard (Archard and Skivenes, 2010; Elster, 1989; 
Mnookin, 1975; Munro, 2019; Banach, 1998). 
5.2. Decision-making – hypothesizing variance and congruence 
The expectation is that the analysis of the justifications provided by 
decision-makers will reveal both similarities and variance in the interpre-
tation of the best interest of the child. On the one hand, we expect simi-
larities within and across decision-making groups – child welfare workers, 
experts and judges – and levels (between child welfare services and the 
County Board) as their discretionary space is largely structured by the same 
rules and standards. More so, decision-makers’ discretion is influenced by 
forces relating not only to the structures of law, nor solely to formal policy 
guidelines and political signals, but to the social and professional context 
and to the knowledge and experiences nested within the networks they are 
embedded in (Feldman, 1992; Hawkins, 1992). While acknowledging that 
this could also be a source of inter-group variation, the expectation is 
nonetheless that the child welfare field is contributing to control discretion 
(Hawkins, 1992) or at least providing some normative constraints for how 
discretion is exercised (Feldman, 1992; Oberfield, 2020). Having in mind 
that the three decision-maker groups are all either experts or experienced 
within the field of child welfare (the County Social Welfare Board, 2016; 
NOU, 2017: 8) there is an expectation that their knowledge about children, 
their needs and development, is to some degree reflected in their responses 
and that children’s welfare emerge as a common yardstick. On the other 
hand, variance between decision-making groups and levels, as well as 
within decision-making groups is anticipated (Skivenes and Tefre, 2012; 
Banach, 1998; Berrick et al., 2017). The three decision-making groups 
inhabit different roles and adhere to their assignment to assess and decide 
based on dissimilar terms. An important premise for studying discretion at 
the two decision-making levels is that they do not have the same decision- 
making power and the implications of their decision differ; the child welfare 
workers merely have the power to recommend a case for adoption, the 
County Board has the power to decide. Individuals also bring with them 
their own identities and dispositions to the social and organizational 
context that they enter (March, 1994; Oberfield, 2020) which can influence 
decision-making (Arad-Davidzon and Benbenishty, 2008; Benbenishty 
et al., 2015; Gambrill, 2005). More importantly, they have different pro-
fessional backgrounds and belong to different professional cultures and it is 
expected that their professional knowledge and experience will influence 
their reasoning. For starters, one would expect that judges’ discretion is 
influenced by legal culture and method. Typically, this would be reflected 
in a stronger conformity to concrete rules and focus on individual rights 
(Carnochan et al., 2006; Weinstein, 1997). For child welfare workers, 
decision-making is better understood as belonging to a social service culture 
where the individual is viewed through a biopsychosocial perspective, in 
his or her developmental, social, political, and cultural context (Carnochan 
et al., 2006). Moreover, where ambiguity and uncertainty is an inherent 
part of child welfare decision-making, one could argue that such conditions 
match poorly to the instrumental (see Sheehan, 2018) or binary logics of the 
law in which resolving a case could require that something must be dis-
carded or reconstructed if the information they are faced with is either 
ambiguous or contradictory (Weinstein, 1997; King and Piper, 1995). The 
experts are, as I will return to in the next section, a mixed group of pro-
fessionals. A quarter of the experts have a professional background from 
child welfare and their reasoning could come close to what we find in the 
first line. In most cases however, the expert is a psychologist, and is 
reasonable to expect that experts as a group would emphasize aspects 
related to psychological theory, such as attachment. 
6. Methods and data10 
To study how decision-makers justify their recommendations for action a 
survey vignette design is applied. The vignette is a widely used approach in 
social science studies (Finch, 1987; Taylor, 2005) and a range of studies has 
shown that the assessments of respondents resemble those of real-life de-
cisions (see Peabody et al., 2000). While Taylor (2005) asserts that the 
vignette is generally suitable when researchers want to study how different 
case factors affect professional assessments, Wilks (2004; see also Soydan, 
1996) emphasizes the benefits of the applicability of vignettes to study sen-
sitive topics and ethical decision-making, such as child protection issues, and 
its capability to address social desirability issues and reduce observer effects. 
Several measures were undertaken to facilitate for professional assessments 
that mirror real life decisions and to motivate the decision-makers to engage 
in the hypothetical decision-making task they were presented with. The 
vignette was developed by the author and two fellow researchers on the basis 
of actual decisions on adoption from the County Board (n = 283 decisions 
from the years 2011–2016) and have been tested on a panel of experts, end- 
user organizations11 and on fellow researchers. In the following, a sum-
mary of the case description the respondents received, which was about one 
10 Ethical considerations: This study is reported to the Norwegian Centre for 
Research Data and has received project numbers 52781 and 5490.  
11 A County Board decision maker (a judge), two child welfare workers and a 
manager, representatives from the Norwegian Foster Care Organization, The 
National Association for Children in the Child Welfare System (LFB), the Joint 
Migrant Council (Hordaland), the Norwegian Union of Social Educators and 
Social Workers (FO) and the Organization for Child Welfare Parents (OBF). 
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page (see full vignette in Appendix section 1), is provided12. 
David is a four-year-old boy, whose foster parents since he was ten days 
old want to adopt him. During the time he has spent in the foster home, his 
parents have not filed for reunification. Both parents struggle with substance 
abuse and the father with mental illness and they have not been able to make 
use of the measures provided to them. Neither have they received any treat-
ment for their substance abuse problems. There is limited formal visitation 
between David and his parents. His parents have on several occasions 
neglected to show up for these visitations. It has been reported that David has 
reacted negatively to the latest visitations. Other than that, David is said to be 
developing well but that he has a vulnerability and a need for stability and 
security. The CWS assesses that it is not likely that David’s parents are to be 
able to provide him with proper care neither now nor in the future and the 
placement is assumed long-term. In the CWS’s opinion, the foster parents are 
David’s psychological parents and there is no attachment to his biological 
origins besides an awareness of their relation. David’s parents oppose an 
adoption and his foster parents do not consent to an open adoption. 
Before reading about David, the decision-makers were asked to 
envision that this was a case that they were responsible for and told that 
they would be asked to evaluate David’s current situation and conclude 
on a course of action. After reading the case, the respondents were asked 
to consider the following question: “Based on this short description of 
the case, in your opinion, would you suggest adoption or continued 
foster care for David?” (Q1). They were given two options: adoption or 
foster care. Following this, they were asked two open-ended questions 
that they responded to using their own words. First, “Which specific 
features of this case are decisive to your decision?” (Q2) and then sec-
ond: “In which way would this case have to be different for you to make 
a different decision?” (Q3). On average, the decision-makers listed three 
different case factors for why they chose adoption. The number of fac-
tors mentioned varied from one to eight. When asked what would have 
to be different, they listed one consideration on average. The number of 
considerations mentioned varied from one to four. 
The survey was developed in 2017 and the child welfare workers 
were recruited from the 15 largest municipalities (>50 000 inhabitants) 
in Norway (40 child welfare agencies from 21 municipalities: total N =
1444) and the County Board members were recruited from all 1213 
County Boards in the country (experts N = 365 and judges N = 79)14. 
Laymen were not included in the study as most of them have very 
limited experience with decision-making in the County Board. In total, 
781 (41 percent) decision-makers responded to the survey (556 child 
welfare workers, 183 experts, and 42 judges), whereof 651 (34 percent) 
responded to Q1 about the vignette (461 child welfare workers, 158 
experts and 32 judges). In this study, only the justifications (Q2 and Q3) 
from those who chose adoption is analyzed (see Tables 2 and 3). The 
experts that responded to the vignette (n = 158) were mostly psychol-
ogists (65 percent), followed by child welfare workers/social workers/ 
child welfare officers (26 percent), other or unknown (5 percent), and 
medical doctors (4 percent). 
The approach to coding the open-ended responses was mainly 
inductive, but the development of categories was guided by law and 
jurisprudence, previous research and conceptions of what is considered 
reasonable (descriptions of coding and categorization of the text are 
provided in the appendix table A1 and A2). As the coding was empiri-
cally driven, the codes and the categorization of responses are re-
flections of how the respondents formulated their answers15. All text was 
coded and excerpts that did not fit into any of the categories, that were 
ambiguous or unclear, or where the respondent did not respond to the 
question, were coded as “Other” or “Not applicable”, respectively, and 
excluded from further analysis. If the whole response was coded as not 
applicable, the respondent was taken out of the sample16. 
7. Limitations 
The vignette method has known limitations related to realism, 
complexity and whether the respondents’ answers reflect what they 
would have actually done. It is difficult to say if the vignette is perceived 
as realistic by the respondents, but the measures taken to ensure realism 
are considered sound. As for the complexity of the situation, the vignette 
provides little information compared to what decision-makers would 
have at their disposal in real life, and two potential weaknesses is that 
respondents may have too little information to engage in the situation 
and that more detailed information could potentially impact their de-
cision and how they reason their choice. Furthermore, what is expressed 
in the respondents’ answers may not necessarily reflect how they would 
act in a real situation and respondents may have several reasons for 
answering in ways that may seem more socially acceptable or more 
acceptable to the researchers (Barter and Renold, 2000; Finch, 1987; 
Wilks, 2004). Nonetheless, their responses do reflect how they respond 
to a scenario that is likely to be a realistic issue and thus provide us with 
information about their immediate assessment of what are relevant 
considerations in a decision. Another limitation is related to sample sizes 
as there are comparatively fewer judges than experts and, especially 
child welfare workers. While this could cause an increase in the margin 
of error in interpretation, a strength of this study is that the entire 
population of judges (n = 79) were approached in the survey and near 
half of them (n = 32) are included in sample for this article. 
8. Findings 
The vast majority of decision-makers, irrespective of professional or 
institutional affiliation, suggest that David should be adopted (see 
Table 1). The rates are consistently high in all groups and the highest 
rate in favor of adoption is found with the experts, where 94 percent 
suggest adoption. 
8.1. Why did they choose adoption? 
The five factors that are highlighted the most by the decision-makers 
Table 1 
Adoption or continued foster care for David? Care alternative by percentage and 




Judges Experts Total 






Foster care 13.7% (63) 12.5% (4) 6.3% (10) 11.8% (77) 
Total 100% (461) 100% (32) 100% (158) 100% (651)  
12 The vignette and the citations from decision-makers’ responses to the 
vignette is translated by the author from Norwegian to English.  
13 By January 1st, 2020, the number of County Boards is reduced to 10 due to 
a reformation of the municipality system.  
14 Information regarding data protection ethics and data access for the 
ACCEPTABILITY project is found at the following website: https://www. 
discretion.uib.no/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/INFORMATION-ABOUT- 
DATA-PROTECTION-ETHICS-AND-DATA-ACCESS.pdf. See also Helland and 
Skivenes (2019) for an elaboration of the process of obtaining access to the 
respondents and data material, and for a full description of the process of 
constructing the vignette. 
15 See appendix section 2 for limitations on the coding of the empirical 
material.  
16 Two percent of the respondents (only child welfare workers) were omitted 
from further analysis due to non-applicable responses to Q2. For Q3, five 
percent of the child welfare workers, seven percent of the judges, and 13 
percent of the experts were omitted for the same reason. 
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as a joint group (see Table 2) are the boy’s attachment to his foster 
parents (66 percent), his parents’ inability to change and provide 
adequate care (61 percent), the boy’s age – both in present and at the 
time of placement – as well as the time he has spent with the foster 
family (55 percent), the poor quality of visitation (contact) and negative 
reactions (46 percent) and finally, the needs of the child and that 
adoption provides permanence and has positive effects (45 percent).17 
8.1.1. Attachment to foster parents 
The child’s attachment to his foster parents is the most mentioned 
factor by child welfare workers (67 percent) and experts (65 percent), 
while just above half (56 percent) of the judges emphasize this. In 
addition to references to attachment or bonds to foster parents, which 
occur most commonly, notions about his foster parents’ parentage and 
the boy’s understanding of them as parents are mentioned. An illustra-
tive example is: 
«The boy’s attachment to the foster home. They are the ones that are 
his psychological parents» (Child welfare worker, 308825066). 
8.1.2. Parents’ inability to change and to provide adequate care 
While the parents’ inability to change and provide adequate care is a 
major element in the justifications of child welfare workers (61 percent) 
and experts (65 percent), judges (37 percent) mention this to a lesser 
degree. Two interrelated themes are apparent in this category. First, the 
parents’ lack of motivation, ability or potential to change and for not 
accepting help or treatment and second, they are not in a position to 
provide care for the child: 
«The biological parents’ unwillingness and inability to receive 
treatment and to change their substance abuse problems and their 
inability to provide the boy with adequate care in the short and long 
term» (Expert, 341937893). 
These considerations commonly arrive contextualized in terms of 
time, where the lack of change over time and prospects of future change 
is emphasized. Some assess reunification as unlikely or refer to the de-
scriptions provided by the child welfare services that it is unlikely that 
the parents will be able to provide care for the child neither now nor in 
the future. 
8.1.3. Time and age 
Time and age is the third most mentioned factor by child welfare 
workers (56 percent) and experts (49 percent) while it is the most 
decisive element for judges whereof 63 percent have time and age as a 
determining factor. References to time and age can be interpreted as 
reflections of the permanence of the placement and include an array of 
considerations, such as the early placement, the child’s current age, the 
duration of the stay with his foster parents – and consequently, not 
having lived with his biological parents – and the assumed long-term 
character of the placement: 
«Long time in the foster home from a young age. No prospects of 
reunification. (…)» (Judge, 341937947) 
8.1.4. Poor quality of visitations (contact) and negative reactions 
This aspect is mentioned less by child welfare workers (48 percent) 
and experts (38 percent) than judges (59 percent) and relates to the 
quality of contact, frequency and outcome of visitations between the boy 
and his parents. On the one hand, this category accommodates child- 
centered reasoning concerning the child’s negative reactions to 
visitation, poor interaction with his parents, that it is harmful or difficult 
for the child that parents are not following up on visitation and that the 
visitations do not provide anything to the child in terms of enriching his 
life or that he is enjoying the visits: 
«The quality of visitations and the child’s reactions before and after 
[visitation]» (Child welfare worker, 309229488). 
On the other hand, the decision-makers refer to the parents’ weak 
“visitation competency” and their apparent lack of interest in the child, 
particularly with reference to the missed visitations: 
«The parents have not always followed up on visitation as planned 
(…)» (Judge, 341937971). 
There is also the more general argument that there has not been 
much contact, referring to both the frequency of visitation permitted by 
the authorities and the lack of follow-up from the parents. 
8.1.5. Needs of the child and adoption provides permanence and has 
positive effects 
About half of the child welfare workers (47 percent), 38 percent of 
the experts and 52 percent of the judges mention aspects which adhere 
to the needs of the child and the benefits of adoption. First, adoption is 
seen as providing permanence in terms of clarifying the child’s life sit-
uation by creating new legal bonds and by hindering future litigation 
and affirming existing relations between the child and his caregivers: 
«The positives about an adoption; that David would become a full 
worthy member of the family, have the same family name, same 
rights as potential siblings in the foster home» (Child welfare worker, 
308824833). 
Second, they argue that adoption would be beneficial for the social 
and psychological well-being of the child. They emphasize the benefits 
in relation to the child’s feelings, his vulnerability and possible special 
needs and assert that adoption would strengthen his sense of belonging 
and provide safety, stability, and tranquility: 
«The boy’s situation – a vulnerable child with a need for stability and 
safety» (Expert, 341937839). 
Third, there are statements based in general knowledge or research 
about the benefits of adoption in terms of positive and better outcomes 
for children in care and of its potential to adjust for previous harm: 
«Research show that children who are adopted fare better later in 
life. Adoption will be in the best interest of the child» (Child welfare 
worker, 308825063). 
Further, some few references to equality, normality and reducing 
public interference are identified. 
8.2. What would have had to be different for them to change their 
decision to continued foster care? 
Biological parents’ ability and initiative for positive change (86 
percent) is indisputably the most important factor mentioned by all 
decision-maker groups (see Table 3). Furthermore, one quarter of the 
respondents (24 percent) would choose differently if there were to be 
bonds or attachment between the boy and his parents and 17 percent 
mention considerations related to time and duration of the placement.18 
8.2.1. Parents show positive change and the quality of visitation (contact) is 
adequate or good 
Most child welfare workers (87 percent), experts (85 percent) and 
17 See appendix section 3 for descriptions of factors “Lack of bonds to parents”, 
“Foster parents wants to adopt and are suited” and “The boy’s current situation 
of care and development”. 
18 See appendix section 4 for descriptions of factors “Foster parents (home) not 
suitable or not wanting adoption” and “The child’s needs were different”. 
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judges (88 percent) see parental change and better quality of visitations 
(contact) as something that could turn their decision. This category is 
layered as it includes two indistinguishable and partly interdependent 
considerations concerning parents’ capabilities and proven ability to 
make changes to their life and to improve the quality and attendance to 
visitation. In sum, commitment and reformation are the key elements to 
understand what would make the decision-makers change their decision 
from adoption to continued foster care: 
«That the parents addressed their own drug abuse, showed good 
interaction during visitation, were stable in their attendance [to 
visitation]». (Child welfare worker, 308824606). 
They emphasize the parents’ will and ability to demonstrate change 
or that they are motivated or willing to take measures to reform them-
selves, for example by accepting treatment for their problems or guid-
ance from the CWS. In other words, if the prospects or potential for the 
parents to become good care givers were better and if they were able to 
demonstrate a positive development, this could change the decision- 
makers’ decision. Some also specify that the parents should receive help 
and guidance from the CWS in the process. A significant part of these 
depictions are related to visitation and 54 percent of the child welfare 
workers, 46 percent of the experts and 72 percent of judges mention 
aspects directly related to visitation: 
«Parents are sober and manage to follow up on visitation. Treatment 
of addiction and mental illness». (Expert, 341937784). 
The respondents argue that they would choose foster care instead of 
adoption if the parents were showing up to visitation and if the contact 
were more frequent. Furthermore, it mattered whether the parents 
would be able to improve their interaction with the child and carry out 
visitation that were beneficial to the child, or at least not harmful or 
negatively affecting the child. The latter point is important, as in one 
third of the child welfare workers’ and experts’, and half of the County 
Board members’, mentions of visitation, the contact is not explicitly 
described in terms of having to be good, meaningful, developmentally 
supportive or positive for the child. Nor do they express as a necessity 
that the child has a need for or wants to meet his parents: 
«[The parents] showed up for all visitations – That the boy did not 
have as many reactions». (Child welfare worker, 308824610). 
8.2.2. There are bonds to parents 
About one fourth of child welfare workers (24 percent), experts (24 
percent) and judges (28 percent) say they would change their decision if 
the reality was that the child had a relation with or an attachment to his 
parents, or where the parents represented something significant and/or 
positive in the child’s life. 
«That the boy had an attachment to the parents. Now he knows of 
them» (Child welfare worker, 308824174). 
8.2.3. Time and duration of placement 
16 percent of child welfare workers, 18 percent of experts and one 
fifth of the judges (20 percent) mention considerations related to time 
and duration of the placement as factors that could change their deci-
sion. They refer to the timing of the decision and the duration of the 
placement by mentioning the age of the child at the present or at the 
time of the placement, and/or if the boy had been placed in the foster 
home at a later point. 
«(…) if the boy had been considerably older and had lived with his 
parents longer» (Expert, 341937635) 
9. Discussion 
In this study, child welfare decision-makers’ exercise of discretion 
when deciding upon a child’s best interest is analyzed to find out which 
factors are important when child welfare decision-makers decide upon 
adoption, how these factors are balanced against each other and if there 
are differences between individual decision-makers and between 
decision-maker groups and levels in how they reason their choice. 
The analysis shows that adoption is the preferred alternative for four- 
year-old David. Some variance is located between decision-maker 
groups in how different factors are emphasized where child welfare 
workers and experts follow a similar pattern, and judges on several oc-
casions diverge from the observed order. As expected, there is also 
variation within decision-maker groups. Nonetheless, the similarities 
are prevailing. There is agreement in the decision-makers’ overall as-
sessments and the support for adoption is high if certain conditions are 
present. While the formal structures such as legislation and policy 
clearly guide the best interest justifications, the similarities between 
groups in the discretionary application of the law in terms of weighting 
Table 3 
Considerations that had to be different for the decision-makers to have chosen 
differently. Percentage of respondents with at least one mention of the following 
consideration, by decision-maker group. Number of respondents in parenthesis.   





(n = 25) 
Experts 




Parents show positive 
change and the quality of 
visitation (contact) is 
adequate or good 
87% (267) 88% (22) 85% (94) 86% 
(382) 
There are bonds to parents 24% (75) 28% (7) 24% (26) 24% 
(108) 
Time and duration of 
placement 
16% (48) 20% (5) 18% (20) 17% 
(73) 
Foster parents (home) not 
suitable or not wanting 
adoption 
13% (40) 24% (6) 11% (12) 13% 
(58) 
The child’s needs were 
different 
10% (30) 12% (3) 1% (1) 8% (34)  
Table 2 
Determining reasons for choosing adoption. Percentage of respondents with at least one mention of the following consideration, by decision-maker group. Number of 
respondents in parenthesis.   
First line The County Board Total 
Child welfare workers (n = 341) Judges (n = 27) Experts (n = 130) Total (n = 498) 
Attachment to foster parents 67% (230) 56% (15) 65% (85) 66% (330) 
Parents’ inability to change and to provide adequate care 61% (208) 37% (10) 65% (84) 61% (302) 
Time and age 56% (192) 63% (17) 49% (64) 55% (273) 
Poor quality of visitations (contact) and negative reactions 48% (164) 59% (16) 38% (49) 46% (229) 
Needs of the child and adoption provides permanence and has positive effects 47% (159) 52% (14) 38% (49) 45% (222) 
Lack of bonds to parents 23% (80) 30% (8) 15% (20) 22% (108) 
Foster parents wants to adopt and are suited 14% (48) 0% (0) 9% (12) 12% (60) 
The boy’s current situation of care and development 7% (24) 4% (1) 5% (6) 6% (31)  
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imply that child welfare context and wider societal norms contribute to 
shape the exercise of discretion. This is in alignment with previous 
research from Norway that show high agreement between child welfare 
workers and judges (as well as the population) in assessments of what is 
a neglect case (Berrick et al., 2020) and of what is an adoption case 
(Helland and Skivenes, 2019). The main features of the findings corre-
spond with previous research on how Norwegian decision-makers 
reason adoption from care (Skivenes and Tefre, 2012). A number of 
best interest elements emerge, and the child’s attachment to his foster 
family, his parents’ inability to change and to provide adequate care and 
the child’s age, as well as the time and length of placement are the main 
reasons for choosing adoption. However, when collating the findings for 
how the decisions were justified with the factors that were found potent 
enough change a decision from adoption to continued foster care, the 
decision-makers’ consensus is striking and it is evident that the decisive 
factors are parental capabilities and the quality of visitation between the 
child and his parents. The findings reveal that though attachment, iso-
lated, is the most important factor in a decision, it is not in fact a pivotal 
reason for adoption. While the rationales behind the justifications for 
adoption were varied and largely child-centered, the considerations that 
embodied the power to transform a decision was mainly parent-oriented 
and focused entirely on the parents and/or the relationship the child has 
or could have with his parents. This mirrors the tension in modern child 
welfare law between family preservation and partnership with perma-
nence planning for children in alternative care (Parkinson, 2003). It 
discloses a paradox within the discretionary process where foster family 
attachment and the permanence of the placement, deemed as the most 
important considerations in a decision on adoption, essentially become 
redundant in the occasion where changes in parental behaviour and the 
quality of visitation occurs or has the potential to occur. This will be 
discussed in further detail, but before we return to this matter, some of 
the observed differences and similarities in the decision-makers’ 
reasoning require closer attention. 
9.1. Variances and similarities in discretionary assessments 
As expected, there is variance in how decision-makers justify their 
decision. First, there is variation within the three decision-making 
groups. A majority of the individual decision-makers agree upon the 
same set of determining factors, yet a considerable proportion of the 
decision-makers do not include certain factors in their reasoning. For 
example, while attachment was the most mentioned factor in favor of 
adoption by child welfare decision-makers, 33 percent of the individual 
decision-makers did not mention attachment as a reason. This could 
reflect different weighting of factors by professional judgment. It could 
also stem from the lack of clear policy and professional guidelines for 
decision-making, and insecurity about what is considered good reasons 
for recommending or deciding on an adoption (Skivenes and Tefre, 
2012). Variation could also be attributed to the decision-makers’ per-
sonal values and convictions (Wallander and Blomqvist, 2005; Terum, 
Torsvik, and Øverbye, 2017; Arad-Davidzon and Benbenishty, 2008) or 
stem from individual characteristics such as work experience and age 
(Berrick et al., 2017) but the extent of such influence is not known as it is 
not controlled for in the analysis. Second, there is variation between the 
three decision-making groups. The differences are mainly between 
different professional decision-maker groups rather than decision- 
making levels as the divergence is generally starker between experts 
and judges (the County Board members) than that between child welfare 
workers and experts, and those between child welfare workers and 
judges. The diversity of the experts’ professional backgrounds compli-
cates interpretation of this finding. As previously mentioned, a quarter 
of the experts included in this study are either social workers, child 
welfare workers or child welfare officers. A proportion of this group is 
thus positioned closer professionally to the child welfare worker 
respondent group than to the judges, something that may explain some 
of the convergence between experts and child welfare workers. 
While attachment, followed by parents’ inability to change and to 
provide adequate care, is the most important considerations for child 
welfare workers and experts, time and age are mentioned most often by 
judges, followed by poor quality of visitation (contact) and the child’s 
negative reactions. There are no timelines given for when adoption can 
and should be decided upon in the Norwegian system (Helland and 
Skivenes, 2019; cf. Fenton-Glynn, 2016), but determining the perma-
nence of a placement is of vital importance to establish the legality of a 
non-reversible and permanent measure such as adoption. This could 
elucidate why judges emphasize this as strongly (see e.g. Breen et al., 
2020). According to Breen and colleagues (2020), time is also essential 
for the ECtHR when they assess the stability of a placement and in R. and 
H. v. UK (2011) the court emphasize that: 
“when a considerable period of time has passed since a child was 
originally taken into public care, the interest of a child not to have his 
or her de facto family situation changed again may override the in-
terests of the parents to have their family reunited …” (para. 88). 
The authors of this study analyzed all the ECtHR’s judgments on 
adoption from care and discover that the court finds a considerable 
period of time to be somewhere between three and four years (Breen 
et al., 2020), leaving David’s placement well within the scope of what is 
considered as considerable time in care. If we were to accept the 
assertion that law has an inherent unwillingness to hold ambiguous 
information (Weinstein, 1997), one could also speculate that the 
unambiguity of time and age is appealing to legal decision-makers and 
that it compensates for the lack of clear rules that facilitate for sub-
sumption. Furthermore, concerns about parental capability and contact 
are strongly interconnected. The judges’ comparatively lower focus on 
parents’ inability to change and to provide adequate care should thus be 
interpreted in light of their comparatively higher focus on the quality of 
visitation and the negative reactions of the child. The reason why legal 
decision-makers emphasize this more strongly could be traced to the 
instrumental method of legal decision-making as broadly informed by 
principles based on case law (Schön, 1983). In Norwegian and inter-
national case law, visitation (contact) is traditionally given a great deal 
of attention and due weight (see e.g. Prop. 7 L (2009–2010), 2009). 
9.2. Discretion and the weight of parental capability 
Legally, the decision-makers’ discretion is constrained by the fact 
that either attachment or parental inability to provide care must be 
proven in order to consent to adoption. When analyzing all decisions 
made on adoption in the County Board in 2016 (N = 59), Helland and 
Nygård (2021) furthermore found that attachment was an important 
consideration in the County Boards’ best interest assessment. The 
emphasis these concerns are given is thus not surprising. The deci-
sion-makers’ initial focus on attachment, together with their general 
concern with time and permanence, should be understood in connection 
with the stability principle in the child welfare system (Kilkelly, 2017). 
Here, children’s interests in stable and continuous relationships to adults 
and other important persons and surroundings are to be promoted in 
assessments and decisions concerning them (Barne-, ungdoms- og fam-
iliedirektoratet, 2019) and the decision-makers reasoning is assumed to 
be a reflection of professional knowledge on children’s attachment re-
lationships, as its importance for children’s development and well-being 
is well-established scientific knowledge (Rasmussen et al., 2019; Sroufe, 
2005)19. Skivenes and Tefre (2012) suggested that the emphasis on 
attachment in adoption assessments could reflect the child-centric 
orientation of the Norwegian child welfare system. This may well be 
the case, yet what the present study shows is that parental capabilities 
19 The usage of methods and interpretations of such relations, however, are 
not agreed upon. 
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(including visitation quality) is not only highly important in the justi-
fications for adoption, it is also the factor that holds virtually sole 
transformative power, indicating that there must be more to the story. 
The research review demonstrated that parental behavior and qualities 
commonly feature in justifications for and against adoption. It was the 
most frequently mentioned reason for adoption by Norwegian decision 
makers in Skivenes and Tefre’s study from 2012 and in DeRoma and 
colleagues’ study from 2006 parental motivation was found to be the 
second most important factor in decision-making regarding the removal 
of children. In Dingwall, Eekelaar and Murray’s (2014 [1983]) seminal 
work The Protection of Children: State Intervention and Family Life, the 
ascription of moral characteristics to parents was revealed to be a central 
feature of the practices of child protection workers. They also proposed 
that the threshold for legal intervention was considered met if parental 
incorrigibility could be proven (Kettle and Jackson, 2017). When 
determining whether a placement is considered permanent or not, sec-
tion 4–20 allows decision-makers to bypass a conclusion on parental 
capabilities by a discretionary assessment of the individual case and 
permits them to make the decision based on attachment alone (Lindboe, 
2011). Even so, the best interest conclusion appears to be dependent on 
parents that are permanently unable to provide proper care. This points 
to a discretionary practice where a decision on adoption is reliant on 
both attachment and parental capability, yet with the latter as the factor 
that tips the scale. It is thus obvious that the commitment and refor-
mation of the parents and their relationship with the child is a, or maybe 
the, decisive best interest consideration. This raises an interesting 
question: do decision-makers find it controversial or challenging to 
conclude that adoption is in the best interest of the child if parents’ 
current and/or future parental capability is considered adequate? Or 
similarly when parents’ predicted capabilities are unclear? If so, this 
could indicate that decision-makers are safeguarding their decision by 
holding that both attachment and parental inability to provide care must 
be proven for them to opt for adoption. 
9.3. Liberal ideals and thresholds for intervention 
From the perspective of the child, the balancing of considerations 
essentially becomes a matter of weighting the child’s right to a legally 
established biological family relation and the right to a de facto family 
life. It is apparent still, that the emphasis on parents’ capabilities and 
ability to change signals that the protection of parents’ right to maintain 
parental responsibility over their biological child is strong, and that 
legal relations and biology are normatively powerful sentiments that 
influence decision-makers discretion at the point of tipping the scale in a 
balancing exercise (Dingwall, Eekelaar, and Murray, 2014; Ward, 
Brown, and Westlake, 2012; Ward, Brown, and Hyde-Dryden, 2014; 
Young, 2012). Their focus on visitation indicate that the biological 
principle in both its ‘weak’ and ‘legal’ form, expressed through the 
valuing of contact (weak) and legal bonds (legal) (Skivenes 2002) holds 
a particular strong position in adoption decision-making. From this it 
becomes apparent that the guiding principles of the law, especially the 
biological principle and the principle of the least intrusive measure, are 
strongly contributing to shape justifications for and against adoption. 
Both principles facilitate for decision-making by what Dingwall, Eeke-
laar and Murray (2014 [1983]) have termed “the rule of optimism”. The 
rule applies as a practical solution to the child welfare systems’ inherent 
task of balancing the respect for family autonomy and parental liberty 
with the demand to protect the needs and welfare of children – the 
’dilemma of liberalism’ – where staff become required to think the best 
of parents (Dingwall, Eekelaar, and Murray, 2014 [1983]). Because 
operational rules for decision-making are not possible in child welfare, 
additional assessments of parents’ moral character and parental re-
sponsibility is applied to determine if a case meets the legal threshold for 
intervention based on ideas of deviance, assessments that according to 
Dingwall and his colleagues can be neutralized by cultural relativism 
and the idea of ‘natural love’ (Kettle and Jackson, 2017; Dingwall, 
Eekelaar, and Murray, 2014 [1983]). In other words, concluding that 
the threshold for intervention is met becomes harder once deviance 
cannot (longer) be proven. This can be related further to features of the 
Norwegian child welfare system. Typically, Norwegian child welfare 
practice is characterized as influenced by the principle of positive liberty – 
to optimize the capabilities and opportunities of citizens (Berrick and 
Skivenes, submitted for publication) and the parent-oriented focus of the 
pivotal factors could reflect the family-service-oriented function of the 
Norwegian child welfare system (Burns, Pösö, and Skivenes, 2017; 
Skivenes, 2011) where cooperation with parents and their abilities to 
rehabilitate and improve their parenting skills is valued in order to 
secure the interests of children. At the same time, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that the reluctance to go for adoption if parents commit and 
reform may also have been influenced by a protection of parental rights 
from the perspective of negative liberty – to be protected from outside 
interference (Holland and Scourfield, 2004) – inherent in among other 
ECtHR (Article 8) and The Norwegian Constitution (Article 102, cf. 104) 
(NOU, 2016) on the right to protection of family life. Alongside the best 
interest standard, interventions in child protection are often legitimated 
through the activation of some form of the ‘harm principle’ (Berrick and 
Skivenes, submitted for publication), entailing that individuals’ freedom 
can only be restricted if there is danger of harm to others (Mill, 1859). 
Though not particularly characteristic of the Norwegian child welfare 
system, the harm principle appears to serve as a threshold for inter-
vention for decision-makers. Believing that parents will not exercise 
their parental rights in harmful ways could mediate the assessment of 
risk of harm to the child. Intervening with the parents’ parental rights 
may thus appear as less legitimate and necessary. 
10. Concluding remarks 
From the discretionary exercise child welfare decision-makers car-
ried out when posed with the vignette about David, we see the re-
flections of a practice where support for adoption is ultimately 
dependent on the weighting of two decisive norms: the right to biolog-
ical family life and the right to a de facto family life. The consistency in 
how these elements are emphasized and balanced indicate that, within 
the space of discretion, there is a hierarchy of norms and standards 
guiding the discretionary application of the law on adoption in decision- 
making. Though one cannot claim that the decision-makers’ reactions to 
the vignette are necessarily representative of real-life actions, their re-
sponses suggest that adoption is understood as the appropriate choice 
for a child whose attachment is to his or her foster parents. It is none-
theless clear that the legal bonds between the child and his or her par-
ents and the value of parent-child contact tips the scale in disfavor of 
adoption if parents are able to reform and commit to change. While the 
uniformity in attitudes do create some form of predictability, what 
appear as near standardized judgment may indicate that ideology is a 
force that governs discretion, and the legitimacy of the reasoning can be 
questioned. Adjusting the law and enforcing ‘practice produced’ criteria 
for decision-making challenge the legal structures that constrain 
discretion in the sense that decision-makers construct their own 
informal standards to accommodate contradicting expectations. The 
pivotal weight given to parental capabilities and commitment further-
more suggests that the law is a step ahead of practice. While the child- 
centered elements of the law are welcomed by decision-makers, they 
are difficult to implement due to the normative conflicts that arise, 
conflicts that appear to be enhanced by the contradictory forces of the 
law’s guiding principles. This calls for both structural and epistemic 
measures of accountability to guide decision-making behavior and 
improve the quality of discretionary reasoning (Molander, Grimen, and 
Eriksen, 2012). 
To further understand and improve decision-making, we need more 
research that 1) explores the attitudes and practices of decision-makers 
and aims to unbox the mechanisms that allow for and guide discre-
tionary practices in decisions on adoption and 2) that address 
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professional decision-makers interpretations of the law and the best 
interest of the child and how this coincides with popular opinion and 
policy. This could be achieved through, inter alia, studies of court 
judgments and by investigating actual decision-making processes at the 
street-level. 
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Removals by the State: A Cross-Country Analysis of Decision-Making Systems (pp. 
40–64). New York: Oxford University Press.  
Skivenes, M., & Tonheim, M. (2017). Deliberative decision-making on the Norwegian 
county social welfare board: the experiences of expert and lay members. Journal of 
Public Child Welfare, 11(1), 108–132. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
15548732.2016.1242447 
Skivenes, M., & Sørsdal, L. M. (2018). The Child’s Best Interest Principle across Child 
Protection Jurisdictions. In A. Falch-Eriksen, & E. Backe-Hansen (Eds.), Human Rights 
in Child Protection - Implications for Professional Practice and Policy (pp. 59–88). Cham: 
Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94800-3_4.  
Sloan, B. (2015a). Fostering and adoption as means of securing article 6 rights in 
England. Stellenbosch Law Review, 26(2), 363–379. 
Sloan, B. (2015b). Adoption decisions in England: Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: 
Appeal) and beyond. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 37(4), 437–457. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09649069.2015.1121962 
Soydan, H. (1996). Using the vignette method in cross-cultural comparisons. In 
L. Hantrais, & S. Mangen (Eds.), Cross-national research methods in the social sciences 
(pp. 20–128). London: Pinter.  
Sroufe, L. A. (2005). Attachment and development: A prospective, longitudinal study 
from birth to adulthood. Attachment & Human Development, 7(4), 349–367. https:// 
doi.org/10.1080/14616730500365928 
Taylor, B. J. (2005). Factorial surveys: Using vignettes to study professional judgement. 
British Journal of Social Work, 36(7), 1187–1207. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/ 
bch345 
Tefre, Øyvind (2020a). The Child’s best interests and the politics of adoptions from care 
in Norway. The International Journal of Children’s Rights, 28(2), 288–321. https://doi. 
org/10.1163/15718182-02802004 
Tefre, Øyvind. 2020b. Exploring Boundaries of Legitimate State Intervention: Adoption 
as a Child Protection Measure in Norway and the United States. Doctoral Thesis, 
Bergen: University of Bergen. 
H.S. Helland                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Children and Youth Services Review 119 (2020) 105693
12
Terum, Lars Inge, Gaute Torsvik, and Einar Øverbye. 2017. “Når vilkår og aktivitetskrav 
brytes. Frontlinjearbeideres tilnærming til sanksjoner.” Søkelys på arbeidslivet 34 
(03): 147–66. https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-7989-2017-03-01. 
The County Social Welfare Board. Negotiation Meeting. Available from: https://www. 
fylkesnemndene.no/en/procedures/court-hearing-procedure/. 
The Norwegian Constitution. 1814. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway. 
Available at: https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/1814-05-17. 
Triseliotis, J. (2002). Long-term foster care or adoption? The evidence examined. Child & 
Family Social Work, 7(1), 23–33. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2206.2002.00224. 
x 
Vinnerljung, B., & Hjern, A. (2011). Cognitive, educational and self-support outcomes of 
long-term foster care versus adoption. A Swedish national cohort study. Children and 
Youth Services Review, 33(10), 1902–1910. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
childyouth.2011.05.016 
Wallander, L., & Blomqvist, J. (2005). Who ‘Needs’ compulsory care?: A factorial survey 
of Swedish social workers’ assessments of clients in relation to the care of abusers 
(special provisions) act. Nordic Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 22, 63–85. https://doi. 
org/10.1177/145507250502201S24 
Ward, H., Brown, R., & Westlake, D. (2012). Safeguarding Babies and Very Young Children 
from Abuse and Neglect. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.  
Ward, Harriet, Rebecca Brown, and Georgia Hyde-Dryden. 2014. “Assessing Parental 
Capacity to Change When Children Are on the Edge of Care: An Overview of Current 
Research Evidence.” London: Department for Education. 
Ward, J., & Smeeton, J. (2017). The end of non-consensual adoption? Promoting the 
wellbeing of children in care. Practice, 29(1), 55–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
09503153.2016.1164131 
Weinstein, J. (1997). And never the twain shall meet again: The best interests of children 
and the adversary system. University of Miami Law Review, 52(1), 79–176. 
Wilks, T. (2004). The use of vignettes in qualitative research into social work values. 
Qualitative Social Work: Research and Practice, 3(1), 78–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
1473325004041133 
Young, E. (2012). På Sporet Av Adopsjon. Porsgrunn: Høgskolen i Telemark.  
H.S. Helland                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
